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Abstract
This laboratory experiment studies two-stage contests between political parties. In the
first stage, parties run their primaries and in the second stage the winners of the primaries
compete in the general election. The resource expenditures in the first stage by the winning
candidates are partially or fully carried over to the second stage. Experimental results support all
major theoretical predictions: the first stage expenditures and the total expenditures increase,
while the second stage expenditures decrease in the carryover rate. Consistent with the theory,
the total expenditures increase in the number of candidates and the number of parties. Contrary
to the theory, however, expenditures in both stages of the competition exceed theoretical
predictions. Disclosing information about the opponent’s expenditures in the first stage increases
the second stage expenditures and decreases the first stage expenditures.
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1. Introduction
Multi-stage contests are commonly characterized by the number of stages and the extent
to which the expenditures in one stage affect the probability of winning in another stage. The US
presidential race and many other political competitions fall into the category of multi-stage
elimination contests. At each stage, candidates use self-promotion and campaign advertisement
in order to advance to the final stage and win the election. Campaign advertising in earlier stages
enhances the candidate’s image and thus increases the probability of winning the final stage of
the election. Another prominent example of multi-stage elimination contests is the international
competition for hosting the Olympic Games. In this contest, countries are eliminated at each
stage and the resources expended by each country in earlier stages affect the probability of
winning the competition in later stages.
In this study, we are interested in the following questions: What is the effect of
expenditure carryover on the behavior of contestants? How does information about the
expenditures by the opponent affect behavior in different stages of the contest? To answer these
questions we study a two-stage elimination contest between two political parties. In the first
stage, parties run their primaries to select one candidate who proceeds to the final stage. The
resource expenditures in the first stage by the winning candidates are partially or fully carried
over to the second stage. These expenditures carried over to the second stage may be interpreted
as gaining name recognition or enhancing own image. In the second stage, the two finalists
compete against each other in the general election. The winner of the second stage receives an
“election prize”.
Experimental results support all major predictions of the theory: the first stage
expenditures and the total expenditures increase, while the second stage expenditures decrease in
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the carryover rate. Consistent with the theory, the total expenditures increase in the number of
candidates and the number of parties in the contest. Contrary to the theory, however,
expenditures in both stages of the competition exceed theoretical predictions. Such high levels of
expenditures can be explained by the fact that subjects have a non-monetary utility of winning
(i.e., subjects are willing to pay money just to be winners). Most interestingly, we find that
information about the expenditures of opponents in the first stage has an effect on expenditures
of all candidates in both stages, which is not predicted by the theory. In particular, disclosing
information about the opponent’s expenditures in the first stage increases the second stage
expenditures and decreases the first stage expenditures of all candidates. Our findings suggest
that the 1972 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), requiring all candidates to disclose their
campaign expenditures, may have reduced socially wasteful expenditures. Our findings also
speak in favor of the 1974 FECA Amendments that impose spending limits on expenditures in
Presidential elections.
To place our study into the context of previous literature, the following is a brief review
of theoretical and experimental studies on contests. Major theories in contest literature are based
on the seminal model of rent-seeking introduced by Tullock (1980). This model assumes that
contests last for only one stage. However, in the real world, most political, economic and
litigation contests last for multiple stages (Gradstein and Konrad 1999; Baik and Lee 2000; Stein
and Rapoport 2005; Kaplan and Sela 2008).1 In such multi-stage contests, contestants expend
costly resources in each stage in order to advance to the final stage and win the prize. The
expenditures made in earlier stages often affect the expenditures in latter stages. For example, in
many political competitions, candidates who spend more money in early stages are often faced
with budget constraints in the final stage of the competition (Parco, Rapoport and Amaldoss
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2005). Stein and Rapoport (2005) formally introduce such budget constraints into a two-stage
contest. They derive the conditions under which the budget constraint is binding and show how it
may affect the expenditures in both stages. The expenditures made in earlier stages also may
affect the outcomes in latter stages. For example, in the US presidential race, candidates
enhancing their own image through advertising in the primary stage carry over the beneficial
effects of their advertising to the general election. Such carryover comes in the form of name
recognition, favorability, and committed supporters. Baik and Lee (2000) capture such
environment by allowing the first stage expenditures to be carried over to the second stage. In
their model, contestants from two groups compete in a two-stage contest to win a prize. In the
first stage, each group selects a finalist who competes for the prize in the second stage. Firststage expenditures are partially (or fully) carried over to the second stage. Baik and Lee (2000)
demonstrate that the total expenditures increase in the carryover rate and they are equal to the
value of the prize when the first stage expenditures are fully carried over to the second stage.
Empirical studies of multi-stage contests are hard to conduct since it is difficult to
measure individual abilities and expenditures without error (Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990;
Bognanno 2001). With this in mind, several researchers have turned to experimental tests of
multi-stage contests in a laboratory setting. Parco, Rapoport and Amaldoss (2005) and Amaldoss
and Rapoport (2009) report the results of experiments on two-stage contest with budget
constraints. Their findings reject the equilibrium model of Stein and Rapoport (2005) because of
significant over-expenditures in the first stage. Both experimental studies conjecture that the
non-monetary value of winning plays a crucial role in explaining excessive over-expenditures in
the first stage.2 This experimental study builds on a game theoretical model of Baik and Lee
(2000) to investigate the effects of carryover and information disclosure on the individual
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behavior in two-stage political contests. In Section 2 we describe in details the theoretical model.
Section 3 provides experimental design and testable hypotheses. Section 4 reports the results of
the experiment and Section 5 concludes.

2. Theoretical Model
Consider a two-stage contest with a total of
all players are split evenly between
Each player

players (candidates). In the first stage,

groups (parties) and each group consists of

chooses his expenditures level

to influence the probability

players.

of winning the

first stage. This probability is defined by a lottery contest success function:
,

∑

.

(1)

The contestant’s probability of winning depends on his own expenditures relative to the
total expenditures by all players. The winner in each group proceeds to the second stage. In the
second stage,

players compete for a prize of value

(election prize). The probability that

contestant wins in the second stage is given by:
,

,

,

∑

.

(2)

In addition to the second stage expenditures

, a fraction of the first stage expenditures

is carried over to the second stage. The carryover parameter

0,1 denotes the extent to

which the first stage expenditures are carried over to the second stage. This parameter is the
same for all players and is common knowledge. In terms of a political contest, one may interpret
the expenditures carried over from the first stage as name recognition or enhanced image. A
candidate who expends more resources on advertisement in the first stage receives better name
recognition in the second stage, and thus has a higher chance of winning in the second stage.
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To analyze the two-stage contest, we apply backward induction. In the second stage, the
first stage expenditures are already determined. Therefore, the second stage expected payoff of a
, is derived by multiplying player ‘s probability of winning the

risk-neutral player ,
second stage,

, by prize value, , minus the second stage expenditures,

.
(3)

∑

Taking first order conditions with respect to

for all

1, … ,

and solving them

simultaneously we obtain
,

,

(4)

From equations (4) and (2), the equilibrium probability of player
stage is given by

. Furthermore, the expected payoff in the second stage is

. We can now analyze the contest in the first stage between
each player

, can be derived by multiplying player ’s probability of winning the first

, by the expected payoff from the second stage,

expenditures,

players. Assuming

has correct expectations about the second stage expected payoff, the first stage

expected payoff,
stage,

winning the second

, minus the first stage

.
.

∑

(5)

Taking first order conditions with respect to

, and assuming a symmetric pure strategy

equilibrium, we obtain the first stage equilibrium expenditures level:
.

(6)

Combining (4) and (6), the equilibrium solution for the second stage expenditures is
.

(7)
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Formulas (6) and (7) demonstrate how the first and second stage expenditures depend on
the prize value, the carryover rate, and the number of contestants in each stage. Simple
increase, while the

comparative statics reveal that the first stage equilibrium expenditures
second stage equilibrium expenditures

decrease in the carryover rate

(

0 and

0).3

Next, we compute the total expenditures of the entire two-stage contest as the sum of all
individual expenditures in the first and second stage:
.

(8)

The comparative statics of the model predict that the total expenditures
in the carryover rate
(

(

0), number of groups

(

are increasing

0), and number of players

0). The general model described in this section can be viewed as a link between the

models of Amegashie (1999) and Baik and Lee (2000). When placing the restriction

0, the

current model converges to the two-stage contest of Amegashie (1999). On the other hand, when
2 and

0, the model converges to original contest of Baik and Lee (2000).

3. Experimental Design and Procedures
3.1. Experimental Design and Hypotheses
To test the theoretical predictions of our model, we design a laboratory experiment.
Experiments are particularly useful in testing formal models of behavior, and in identifying
conditions under which these models succeed or fail. For a review on political science
experiments see Kinder and Palfrey (1993) and Morton and Williams (2008). The advantage of
using a lab experiment is that it allows us to create an environment that precisely resembles the
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theoretical model described in the previous section. Moreover, the lab experiment allows us to
observe individual expenditures without error.
Table 1: Experimental Design and Equilibrium Expenditures
Treatment
N-FI
P-FI (P-NI)
F-FI (F-NI)
N-FI23
N-FI32

Carryover Groups, Players, Prize, Stage Equilibrium
Total
Expenditures Expenditures
rate,
1
7.5
30
0
2
2
120
2
30
60
1
12
48
0.5
2
2
120
2
24
48
1
30
120
1
2
2
120
2
0
0
1
6.7
40
0
2
3
120
2
30
60
1
3.3
20
0
3
2
120
2
26.7
80

The outline of the experimental design and theoretical predictions for each treatment are
shown in Table 1. Each treatment studies a two-stage contest with a different number of groups,
i.e.

= 2 or

= 3, and with a different number of players per group, i.e.

= 2 or

= 3. The

first stage winner of each group proceeds to the second stage and the winner of the second stage
receives the prize. The financial incentive of

= 120 experimental francs (equivalent to $2) is

used to induce the value of winning a political contest.
In the no carryover treatment N-FI (“N” stands for no carryover and “FI” stand for full
information), the first stage winner’s expenditures are not carried over to the second stage ( =
0). In partial carryover treatments P-FI and P-NI (“P” stands for partial carryover and “NI”
stand for no information), half of the first stage winner’s expenditures are carried over to the
second stage ( = 0.5). In full carryover treatments F-FI and F-NI (“F” stands for full carryover),
all first stage winner’s expenditures are carried over to the second stage ( = 1). The theoretical
model generates several intuitive predictions. As the extent of carryover increases, the
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expenditures made in the first stage increase and the expenditures made in the second stage
decrease. From Table 1, the first stage expenditures increase from 7.5 to 12 and then to 30, and
the second stage expenditures decrease from 30 to 24 and then to 0, as we move from
= 0.5 and then to

= 0 to

= 1. Based on these predictions we formulate the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1. The first stage expenditures increase and the second stage expenditures
decrease in the carryover rate.
The logic behind this hypothesis is intuitive. The higher the extent of carryover, the more
attractive it is for players to make higher expenditures in the first stage since players know that
these expenditures will be carried over to the second stage. On the other hand, since all major
expenditures are made in the first stage, there is no need for further expenditures in the second
stage. Note that the total expenditures also depend on the carryover rate. According to the model,
the total expenditures unambiguously increase in the carryover rate and they are equal to the
value of the prize when
and then to 120 as

= 1. Table 1 shows that the total expenditures increase from 90 to 96

increases from 0 to 0.5 and then to 1.

Hypothesis 2. The total expenditures increase in the carryover rate.
We also study two information conditions: full information and no information. In full
information treatments P-FI and F-FI (“FI” stands for full information), subjects receive full
information about the opponent’s expenditures carried over from the first stage. In no
information treatments P-NI and F-NI (“NI” stands for no information), subjects receive no
information about the opponent’s expenditures carried over from the first stage. If subjects
behave according to the subgame perfect equilibrium, there should be no difference in
expenditures between the two conditions.

9

Hypothesis 3. The information about the expenditures carried over by the opponent from
the first stage does not affect individual behavior.
Finally, we study the effect of number of groups and number of players per group on total
expenditures in the two-stage political contests. For that reason, in treatment N-FI23, we hold the
number of groups constant at
players to
at

= 2 (as in N-FI treatment); however, we increase the number of

= 3. On the other hand, in treatment N-FI32, we hold the number of players constant

= 2 (as in N-FI treatment), and increase the number of groups to

= 3. The prediction of

the theory is that the total expenditures increase both in the number of groups and in the number
of players per group.
Hypothesis 4. The total expenditures increase in the number of groups and in the number
of players per group.

3.2. Experimental Procedures
The experiment involved 132 undergraduate students. All students participated in only
one session of this study. The computerized experimental sessions were run using z-Tree
(Fischbacher 2007). We study seven treatments as in Table 1 in eleven sessions, with 12 subjects
per each session. Each experimental session proceeded in several parts. Subjects were given
instructions at the beginning of each part and the experimenter read the instructions aloud (the
instructions can be found online at this journal’s Web site). The wording in the instructions was
written to induce a neutral environment. Before the actual experiment, subjects completed a quiz
on the computer to verify their understanding of the instructions. The experiment started only
after all subjects had answered all quiz questions. In the first part, subjects made 15 choices in
simple lotteries, similar to Holt and Laury (2002).4 This method was used to elicit individual
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subjects’ risk preferences. The consecutive parts of the experiment corresponded to different
treatments described in Table 1.5 Each treatment had 30 periods. In each period, subjects were
randomly and anonymously placed either into a 2-player or a 3-player group (depending on the
treatment). Subjects were randomly re-grouped after each period. At the beginning of each
period, each subject received an endowment of 120 experimental francs.6 Subjects could use
their endowments to submit expenditures. After all subjects submitted their expenditures in the
first stage, the computer then informed them if they were chosen to proceed to the second stage.
The computer chose the winner of each group by implementing a simple lottery rule. The
finalists of each group again submitted expenditures in the second stage. At the end of the second
stage the computer chose the winner of the prize.
In the final part of the experiment, subjects were given an endowment of 120 francs and
were asked to submit expenditures in a one-stage contest for a prize value 0. Subjects were told
that they would be informed whether they won the contest or not. We used this procedure to
receive an indication of how important it is for subjects to win when winning is costly and there
is no monetary reward for winning.7

4. Results of the Experiment
Table 2 summarizes the average expenditures and average payoffs in treatments N-FI, PF(N)I and F-F(N)I. The striking feature of the data is that, in all two-stage contests, subjects
exert significantly higher expenditures than the equilibrium prediction.8 As a result, average
payoffs are negative. This finding is consistent with previous experimental studies of Davis and
Reilly (1998), Sheremeta (2010b) and Sheremeta and Zhang (2010). In all three studies, the total
expenditures exceeded the prize value and subjects earned, on average, negative payoffs.
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Result 1. Significant over-expenditures are observed in all contests.
Table 2: Average Statistics for Treatments N-FI, P-F(N)I and F-F(N)I
Average Expenditures,
Average Payoff,
Total
Expenditures Equilibrium
Equilibrium
Actual
Actual
1
7.5
13.0 (0.7)
N-FI
132.4
7.5
-3.1 (2.2)
2
30
40.2 (1.7)
1
12.0
18.2 (0.6)
P-FI
148.2
6.0
-7.0 (1.2)
2
24.0
37.7 (0.9)
1
30.0
21.0 (0.7)
F-FI
152.5
0.0
-8.1 (1.1)
2
0.0
34.3 (1.1)
1
12.0
22.0 (0.7)
P-NI
153.1
6.0
-8.3 (1.2)
2
24.0
32.6 (0.9)
1
30.0
33.4 (0.9)
F-NI
171.6
0.0
-12.9 (1.2)
2
0.0
18.9 (0.9)
Standard error of the mean in parentheses.
Treatment Stage

One possible explanation for such over-expenditures is that subjects may have a nonmonetary value for winning. In terms of a political competition, one may argue that, in addition
to monetary incentives, candidates value winning itself and thus their overall value of the
election prize is higher. In our experiment, we elicited a non-monetary value of winning. At the
end of each session, all subjects were given 120 francs and were asked to submit expenditures
for a prize value 0. We were surprised to discover that about 47% of subjects made positive
expenditures: 25% of these subjects chose expenditures between 0.5 and 20, 10% chose between
20.5 and 60, and 12% chose expenditures higher than 60 (60 francs is equivalent to $1). The
average expenditure of subjects who chose to compete in a contest with no prize is 35.9 francs
(equivalent to $0.6). This finding serves as a direct evidence of an earlier conjecture by Morton
(1993) that subjects may “value winning the elections in spite of the monetary rewards of the
experiment.” Moreover, we find that subjects who make higher expenditures in a contest with no
prize, indicating higher non-monetary value of winning, also make higher expenditures in
contests with a prize.9 One may argue that such correlation can be explained by confusion; i.e.
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subjects who make positive expenditures in a contest with no prize are confused, and thus they
make irrationally high expenditures in contests with prize. There are two problems with such an
argument. First, subjects participated in the contest with no prize at the very end of the
experiment, after they played other contests for many periods. Second, before the actual
experiment, subjects completed a quiz to verify their understanding of the contest game.
Controlling for understanding of the contest, we still find significant correlation between
expenditures for no prize and expenditures in contests with prize.10 Therefore, this finding
suggests that the non-monetary value of winning is a good explanation for significant overexpenditures in contests.11 It also highlights the importance of incorporating non-monetary
incentives into models of political competition.
Another point worth noting is the substantial variance in expenditures. Figures 1 and 2
display the full distribution of the first and second stage expenditures in treatments PF(N)I and
FF(N)I. Note that, instead of following a symmetric equilibrium, individual expenditures are
distributed on the entire strategy space between 0 and 120.
Result 2. There is substantial variance in individual expenditures.
High variance in individual expenditures is consistent with previous experimental
findings of the contest literature (Davis and Reilly 1998; Potters, De Vries and Van Linden
1998). Several explanations have been offered. The first is that subjects make mistakes that cause
some variance in expenditures. A second explanation is that subjects have different preferences
towards risk which affect their behavior. In our experiment we elicited a measure of risk attitudes
from a series of lotteries. We find substantial evidence that the measurement of risk attitude is a
good predictor of subject’s behavior in a two-stage contest: more risk-averse subjects make lover
expenditures than less risk-averse subjects.12 Finally, it is also possible that the distribution of
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expenditures reflects individual learning. Subjects may want to test different strategies and how
these strategies affect the probability of winning. However, we do not find evidence for this
explanation, since the variances of expenditures are very similar when comparing the first 15
periods and the last 15 periods of the experiment.13
Figure 1: Distribution of Expenditures in Stage 1 for Treatments P-F(N)I and F-F(N)I
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Figure 2: Distribution of Expenditures in Stage 2 for Treatments P-F(N)I and F-F(N)I
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4.1. The Effect of Carryover
It is well documented in political science that candidates often expend resources during
the primaries in order to carry over the benefits to the general election (Glantz, Abramowitz and
Burkart 1976). The unique feature of our experiment is that it captures the dynamic aspect of a
political contest, allowing us to study the effect of carryover on the first and second stage
expenditures. The equilibrium derived from the theoretical model predicts that, as the extent of
carryover increases, the expenditures made in the first stage increase and the expenditures made
in the second stage decrease. Table 2 shows that in N-FI treatment with no carryover the first
stage expenditures are 13.0. These expenditures increase to 18.2 (22) in P-F(N)I treatment with
partial carryover and they further increase to 21 (33.4) in F-F(N)I treatment with full carryover.
This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 1, indicating that the first stage expenditures increase
in the carryover rate.14 Table 2 also shows that in N-FI treatment the second stage expenditures
are 40.2, and they decrease to 37.7 (32.6) in P-F(N)I treatment, and further decrease to 34.3
(18.9) in F-F(N)I treatment. This finding is also consistent with Hypothesis 1, indicating that
expenditures in the second stage decrease in the carryover rate.15
Result 3. The first stage expenditures increase while the second stage expenditures
decrease in the carryover rate.
Another theoretical prediction concerns the effect of carryover on the total expenditures.
Theory predicts that the total expenditures should increase in the carryover rate. Table 2
indicates that this theoretical prediction is supported. In the N-FI treatment the total expenditures
are 132.4 and they increase to 148.2 in the P-FI treatment, and further increase to 152.2 in the FFI treatment. Similarly, in the P-NI treatment the total expenditures are 153.1 and they increases
to 171.6 in the F-NI treatment. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 2.16
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Result 4. The total expenditures increase in the carryover rate.
In summary, general theoretical predictions with regard to the effect of carryover on the
first stage expenditures, the second stage expenditures, and the total expenditures are supported
by our experiment (Results 3 and 4). While qualitative predictions are supported by the data, the
quantitative predictions of the theory are clearly rejected. This is mainly because of significant
over-expenditures (Result 1) and substantial variation in individual behavior (Result 2). The
potential application of these findings we discuss in the concluding Section 5.

4.2. The Effect of Information Disclosure
Often in political contests candidates are required to reveal the information about their
campaign expenditures. However, it is not obvious how such policy affects the expenditures of
individual candidates. One of the purposes of this study is to investigate how the information
about the expenditures carried over by the opponent affects the behavior in the two-stage
political contest. Our null hypothesis is that there should be no difference in the expenditures
between full information and no information conditions. Contrary to Hypothesis 3, Table 2
reveals a strong difference in the aggregate behavior under the two information conditions. In
particular, subjects expend less in the first stage and more in the second stage when they receive
the information about the expenditures carried over by the opponents.17
Result 5. The first stage expenditures are higher under the no information condition and
the second stage expenditures are higher under the full information condition.
It is also interesting to note that the total expenditures (148.2 and 152.5) under the full
information treatments P-FI and F-FI are lower than the total expenditures (153.1 and 171.6)
under the no information treatments P-NI and F-NI.
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Result 6. The total expenditures are lower under the full information.
In summary, our findings suggest that the information about campaign expenditures
affects a political contest in two important ways. First, information disclosure shifts the
campaign expenditures from the first stage to the second stage. Second, it reduces the total
expenditures of all candidates, thus increasing social welfare.

4.3. The Effect of Number of Groups and Number of Players
To investigate the effects of number of groups (parties) and number of players
(candidates) per group we conducted additional treatments N-FI23 and N-FI32. The summary
statistics of these two treatments and the NFI treatment is shown in Table 3. As predicted by the
theory, the total expenditures increase in the number of groups

. In particular, when comparing

treatments N-FI and N-FI23, as the number of groups increases from

= 2 to

= 3, the total

expenditures increase from 132.4 to 176.7. Similarly, the total expenditures increase in the
number of players per group: the expenditures of 132.4 in treatment N-FI (
increase to 179.7 in treatment N-FI32 (

= 3 and

= 2 and

= 2)

= 2). These findings are consistent with

Hypothesis 4.
Result 7. Total expenditures increase in the number of groups and in the number of
players per group.
This intuitive result points out an important feature of political contests. As the total
number of candidates increases, either through increase in the party size or through increase in
the number of candidates per each party, the total expenditures increase. It is important to
emphasize, however, that the increase in the number of parties has a different effect than the
increase in the number of candidates per each party. In particular, higher number of candidates
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per each party implies higher competition in the first stage, while higher number of parties
implies higher competition in the second stage. In our experiment the total expenditures in the
first stage are much higher in the N-FI23 treatment (112.2=18.7×6) than in the N-FI32 treatment
(63=10.5×6). On the other hand, the total expenditures in the second stage are much lower in the
N-FI23 treatment (67.8=33.9×2) than in the N-FI32 treatment (113.7=37.9×3). In summary, the
intensity of political competition in the first and second stage crucially depends on the number of
candidates in each party and the number of parties. Therefore, depending on the objective, one
can re-structure the contest in order to maximize (or minimize) expenditures made in the first
and second stage of the competition (Gradstein and Konrad, 1999; Moldovanu and Sela, 2006).
Table 3: Average Statistics for Treatments N-FI, N-FI23, and N-FI32
Average Expenditures,
Average Payoff,
Total
Expenditures Equilibrium
Equilibrium
Actual
Actual
1
7.5
13.0 (0.7)
N-FI
132.4
7.5
-3.1 (2.2)
2
30
40.2 (1.7)
1
6.7
18.7 (1.0)
N-FI23
179.7
3.3
-8.4 (1.9)
2
30
33.9 (1.5)
1
3.3
10.5 (0.5)
N-FI32
176.7
3.3
-9.5 (2.1)
2
26.7
37.9 (1.3)
Standard error of the mean in parentheses.
Treatment Stage

5. Conclusion
The use of controlled experiments is a fruitful methodology in political science which has
attracted the attention of many prominent scholars (Green and Gerber, 2003; Druckman, Green,
Kuklinski and Lupia 2006; Battaglini, Morton and Palfrey 2007; Levine and Palfrey, 2007;
Morton and Williams, 2008). The appeal of laboratory experiments is based on two major
factors. First, laboratory experiments provide a great control over the experimental environment.
Second, by randomly assigning human subjects to control and treatment groups, experiments
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offer a unique opportunity to test a wide range of hypotheses about human behavior and how
different policies affect such behavior.
In this study we use a laboratory experiment to investigate the effects of expenditure
carryover, information disclosure, number of candidates, and number of parties on the individual
behavior in two-stage political contests. Experimental results support all major theoretical
predictions: the first stage expenditures and the total expenditures increase in the carryover rate,
and the second stage expenditures decreases in the carryover rate. Also, consistent with the
theory, the total expenditures increase in the number of candidates and the number of parties in
the contest. Disclosing information about the opponent’s carryover expenditures increases the
second stage expenditures and decreases the first stage expenditures. Although the analogies
between our laboratory experiment and naturally-occurring political contests are imperfect, we
believe that our findings provide valuable insights. For example, we find that by manipulating
the information and the extent of carryover rate, the designer can minimize socially wasteful
expenditures in the first stage and encourage the winning candidates to incur all major
expenditures in the second stage. The still widely debated 1972 FECA requires all candidates to
disclose their campaign expenditures. Our findings suggest that such a policy shifts the campaign
expenditures from the first stage to the second stage, reducing socially wasteful resource
expenditures.
The results of the experiment also indicate that expenditures are much higher than the
equilibrium prediction. This finding is different from the findings of Parco, Rapoport and
Amaldoss (2005) and Amaldoss and Rapoport (2009), who find significant over-expenditures
only in the first stage of a two-stage contest with budget constraints, and not in the second stage.
The disparity between our findings and the two studies mentioned above implies that removing
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the budget constraints results in wasteful over-expenditures. One policy implication of this
finding is that the designer of a political contest should impose budget constraints on candidates’
expenditures in order to reduce wasteful over-expenditures. Such argument speaks in favor of the
1974 FECA Amendments, which are designed to lower the cost of campaigning by setting limits
on expenditures in Presidential elections.
This study provides contributions to the literature on political spending (Levitt, 1994;
Gerber, 1998), by explicitly investigating expenditures in different two-stage political contests.
Also, the design of our experiment allows us to document that candidates have non-monetary
values for winning. This finding contributes to the rapidly developing experimental literature
trying to explain over-expenditures in rent-seeking contests (Davis and Reilly 1998; Potters, De
Vries and Van Linden 1998; Amegashie, Cadsby and Song 2007; Sheremeta and Zhang 2010).
Finally, the finding that theoretically irrelevant information may impact individual behavior in
laboratory experiments is an important addition to the experimental political science literature.18
Besides empirical contributions, this study opens several avenues for future research. First, it is
important to further investigate how individual behavior changes when the number of contestants
is large, e.g. as in voting experiments of Levine and Palfrey (2007). Second, it would be
interesting to conduct a field experiment using campaign professionals instead of undergraduate
students. Future research should also consider other realistic extensions to multi-stage contests,
including asymmetric contestants, incomplete information, and endogenous formation of
political groups.

20

References
Amaldoss, W., and Rapoport, A. 2009. Excessive expenditure in two-stage contests: Theory and
experimental evidence. In F. Columbus (Ed.), Game Theory: Strategies, Equilibria, and
Theorems. Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers.
Amegashie, J. A. 1999. The design of rent-seeking competitions: Committees preliminary and
final contests. Public Choice 99: 63–76.
Amegashie, J.A., Cadsby, C.B., and Song, Y. 2007. Competitive burnout: Theory and
experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior 59: 213-239.
Baik, K. H., and Lee, S. 2000. Two-stage rent-seeking contests with carryovers. Public Choice
103: 285–296.
Battaglini, M., Morton, R., and Palfrey, T.R. 2007. Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting
Mechanisms. American Political Science Review 101: 409-424.
Bognanno, M.L. 2001. Corporate Tournaments. Journal of Labor Economics 19: 290-315.
Davis, D., and Reilly, R. 1998. Do many cooks always spoil the stew? An experimental analysis
of rent seeking and the role of a strategic buyer. Public Choice 95: 89-115.
Druckman, J.N., Green, D.P., Kuklinski, J.H., and Lupia., A. 2006. The Growth and
Development of Experimental Research in Political Science. American Political Science
Review 100: 627–35.
Ehrenberg, R.G., and Bognanno, M.L. 1990. Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?, Journal
of Political Economy 98: 1307-24.
Fischbacher, U. 2007. z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic experiments.
Experimental Economics 10: 171-178.
Gerber, A. 1998. Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes
Using Instrumental Variables. American Political Science Review 92: 401-11.
Glantz, S.A., Abramowitz, A.I., and Burkart, M.P. 1976. Election Outcomes: Whose Money
Matters? Journal of Politics 38: 1033-38.
Gradstein, M. 1998. Optimal contest design: Volume and timing of rent seeking in contests.
European Journal of Political Economy 14: 575–585.
Gradstein, M., and Konrad, K.A. 1999. Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests. Economic Journal
109: 536-45.
Green, D and Gerber, A. 2003. The under-provision of experiments in political science. The
Annals of the American Academy 589: 94-111
Holt, C.A., and Laury, S.K. 2002. Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects. American Economic
Review 92: 1644-1655.
Kaplan, T.R., and Sela, A. 2008. Effective Political Contests, Centre for Economic Policy
Research, Working Paper.
Kinder, D.R., and Palfrey, T. 1993. Experimental Foundations of Political Science. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
Levine, D., and Palfrey, T.R. 2007. The Paradox of Voter Participation: A Laboratory Study.
American Political Science Review 101: 143-58.
Levitt, S. 1994. Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effects of Campaign Spending on
Election Outcomes in the U.S. House. Journal of Political Economy 102: 777-798.
Moldovanu, B., and Sela, A. 2006. Contest architecture. Journal of Economic Theory 126: 7096.

21

Morton, R. 1993. Incomplete information and ideological explanations of platform divergence.
American Political Science Review 87: 382–392.
Morton, R.B., and Williams, K.C. 2008. Experimentation in Political Science. In Jan BoxSteffensmeier, Henry Brady, and David Colier, (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political
Methodology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 339-356.
Parco J., Rapoport A., and Amaldoss W. 2005. Two-stage Contests with Budget Constraints: An
Experimental Study. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 49: 320-338.
Potters, J.C., De Vries, C.G., and Van Linden, F. 1998. An experimental examination of rational
rent seeking. European Journal of Political Economy 14: 783-800.
Rosen, S. 1986. Prizes and incentives in elimination tournaments. American Economic Review
76: 701-715.
Roth, A.E. 1987. Bargaining Phenomena and Bargaining Theory. In Roth, A. E., (ed.),
Laboratory Experimentation in Economics. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press,
pp. 14-41.
Schmitt, P., Shupp, R., Swope, K., and Cadigan, J. 2004. Multi-period rent-seeking contests with
carryover: Theory and experimental evidence. Economics of Governance 5: 187-211.
Sheremeta, R.M. 2010a. Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation. Economic Inquiry,
forthcoming.
Sheremeta, R.M. 2010b. Experimental Comparison of Multi-stage and One-stage Contests.
Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming.
Sheremeta, R.M., and Zhang, J. 2010. Can Groups Solve the Problem of Over-Bidding in
Contests? Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming.
Smith, V.L. 1991. Papers in Experimental Economics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Stein, W.E., and Rapoport, A. 2005. Symmetric multi-stage contests with budget constraints.
Public Choice 124: 309-328.
Tullock, G. 1980. Efficient Rent Seeking. In James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, Gordon
Tullock, (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. College Station, TX: Texas
A&M University Press, pp. 97-112.

22

Notes
1

Other theoretical studies of multi-stage elimination contests have been conducted by Rosen (1986), Gradstein
(1998), and Amegashie (1999). All these studies investigate different aspects of multi-stage contests such as
elimination procedures, interdependency between the stages, and asymmetry between contestants.
2
Other experimental studies of multi-stage contests are done by Schmitt, Shupp, Swope and Cadigan (2004),
Amegashie, Cadsby and Song (2007), and Sheremeta (2010b).
3
Other comparative statics reveal that, as the number of players in each group increases, the expenditures in the
first stage decrease and the expenditures in the second stage increase (

0 and

0). Also, as the number of

0). The expenditures in the second stage
groups increases, the expenditures in the first stage decrease (
can either increase or decrease in , depending on and . However, when
0, the second stage expenditures
unambiguously decrease in the number of groups .
4
Subjects were asked to state whether they preferred safe option A or risky option B. Option A yielded $1 payoff
with certainty, while option B yielded a payoff of either $3 or $0. The probability of receiving $3 or $0 varied across
all 15 lotteries. The first lottery offered a 5% chance of winning $3 and a 95% chance of winning $0, while the last
lottery offered a 70% chance of winning $3 and a 30% chance of winning $0.
5
Treatments P-FI (F-FI) and P-NI (F-NI) were ran during eight sessions using switching order design, i.e. AB and
BA. Treatments N-FI, N-FI23 and N-FI32 were ran separately during the three other sessions.
6
The endowment of 120 francs was chosen for several reasons. First, the endowment was chosen to be equal to the
prize value. Second, the endowment was also chosen to be substantially higher than the Nash equilibrium
predictions in order to make sure that in the second stage subjects are not budget constrained.
7
The procedure for the final part of the experiment closely followed Sheremeta (2010b). At the end of the
experiment, 1 out of 15 decisions subjects made in part one was randomly selected for payment. Subjects were also
paid for 5 out of 30 periods in each treatment. The earnings were converted into US dollars at the rate of 60 francs to
$1. On average, subjects earned $25 each which was paid in cash. Each experimental session lasted about 90
minutes.
8
To support this conclusion we estimated a simple panel regression for each treatment, where the dependent
variable is expenditures and independent variable is constant. The model included a random effects error structure,
with the individual subject as the random effect, to account for the multiple decisions made by individual subjects.
The model also used clustered standard errors at the session level to account for session effects. Based on a standard
Wald test, conducted on estimates of a model, we found that for all treatments the constant coefficients are
significantly higher than the predicted theoretical values in Table 4.1 (p-value < 0.05).
9
We estimated a random effects model where the dependent variable is the expenditures and the independent
variables are a period trend, treatment and session dummy-variables, and non-monetary expenditures. The results of
the estimation indicate a very significant and positive correlation between the expenditures in contests with prize
and the expenditures in a contest with no prize.
10
The number of correct quiz answers is a good control variable for confusion. Indeed, we find that subjects who
understand the instructions better (higher number of correct quiz answers) make lower expenditures in contests with
(and without) a prize. Nevertheless, even if we control for this confusion, we still find positive and very significant
correlation between expenditures for no prize and expenditures in contests with a prize. This finding suggests that
winning is a component in a subject’s utility and that higher non-monetary utility of winning causes higher overexpenditures in contests.
11
The conjecture that subjects have non-monetary value of winning has been used by many studies to explain overexpenditures in contests, including Schmitt, Shupp, Swope and Cadigan (2004), Parco, Rapoport and Amaldoss
(2005), Amaldoss and Rapoport (2009). In contrast, the current study presents direct evidence that subjects are
willing to pay money just to be winners.
12
We estimate several random effects models where the dependent variable is the expenditures and the independent
variables are the measurements of risk-aversion, session, and treatment dummy-variables. All specifications indicate
that risk attitudes elicited from lotteries have significant influence on the expenditures.
13
A standard F-test for the equality of variances cannot reject the hypothesis that expenditures have the same
variance in the first 15 periods as in the last 15 periods of the experiment (p-value > 0.1).
14
We estimated random effect models separately for each information condition (FI and NI), with expenditures as
the dependent variable and treatment dummy as the independent variable. In both conditions the dummy-variable is
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significant (p-value < 0.05). When clustering standard errors at the session level, the difference is significant only
for the last 15 periods of the experiment (p-value < 0.05).
15
The differences are statistically significant based on the estimation of random effect models (p-value < 0.05).
When clustering standard errors at the session level, the difference is significant only for the last 15 periods of the
experiment (p-value < 0.05).
16
Because of high variance in individual expenditures, the differences are not significant.
17
The first stage expenditures (22.0 and 33.4) under the no information treatments P-FI and F-FI are higher than the
expenditures (18.2 and 21.0) under the full information treatments P-NI and F-NI. The difference is statistically
significant only when comparing F-FI and F-NI treatments. Similarly, the second stage expenditures (32.6 and 18.9)
under the no information treatments are lower than the expenditures (37.7 and 34.3) under the full information
treatments.
18
It has been long recognized in economics literature that theoretically irrelevant information may have impact on
individual behavior in the laboratory experiments. Smith (1991) found that in continuous double auction under
private information convergence to the Nash equilibrium is faster than under complete information. The argument
that private information can yield more equilibrium-consistent results has also been established in the Nash
bargaining games (Roth 1987).
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